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The need for stringent controls governing the conduct of the real
estate business has never been greater. We are mindful that spec-
ulation in land in Montana in the last several years has skyrock-
eted, with no apparent end in sight. This sale of land as a limit-
less commodity, rather than as one of our most precious and
irreplaceable resources, has also given birth to a burgeoning real
estate industry. The area is bustling with those who are either
getting directly into the act of buying and selling for speculative
reasons, or indirectly by acting as brokers and real estate agents.
The rapid turnover of property is relentlessly encouraged by the
brokers and agents. They are not, however, without their respon-
sibilities to the public.'
[P]ublic policy . . . is to protect the public from unscrupu-
lous and insolvent real estate agents and brokers.2
* B.A., Montana State University, 1975; J.D., Williamette University, 1980; Clerk,
Chief Justice Haswell, Montana Supreme Court, 1982. Mr. Schaplow is an associate with the
firm of Morrow, Sedivy & Bennett in Bozeman, Montana.
1. Carnell v. Watson, 176 Mont. 344, 350, 578 P.2d 308, 312 (1978).
2. Twite v. Western Surety Co., 176 Mont. 286, 289, 577 P.2d 308, 312 (1978).
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I. INTRODUCTION
With statements like these issuing from the Montana Supreme
Court, all brokers and attorneys who represent them are well ad-
vised to keep abreast of the latest case law developments in the
real estate industry in Montana. The purpose of this article is to
discuss and analyze the modern status of the real estate brokerage
law in Montana.' The discussion follows the pattern of a typical
real estate transaction from the broker's vantage point.
A prospective seller will customarily engage a broker through
an employment contract or listing agreement 5 with the scope of the
broker's agency dictated in the agreement.6 The agent then seeks
out prospective buyers who usually execute an agreement to
purchase or a "buy-sell"'7 with the final formal documents being
executed at closing.8 The majority of cases deal with the broker
suing for his commission upon completion of one or more of the
3. As used in this article, "brokers" refers to those licensed under the Montana Real
Estate License Act to sell and deal in real estate, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 37-51-101 through -
401 (1981) and includes real estate salesmen as defined in MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-51-
102(9)(1981).
Any person acting as a broker or salesman must obtain a license, MONT. CODE ANN. §
37-51-301(1981) but an attorney need not procure a license to perform broker-related duties
as a lawyer, MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-51-103(3)(1981). Twite v. Western Surety Co., 176 Mont.
286, 577 P.2d 1219(1978) (court notes that an attorney acting for a client is exempt from the
licensing requirement). For a case involving attorney-brokers suing for commissions, see
Roscow v. Bars, 79 Mont. 292, 256 P. 173(1927).
There are several annotations discussing brokers' licensing requirements. See, e.g,. An-
nots. 82 A.L.R.3d 1139 (1978); 80 A.L.R.3d 318 (1977); 68 A.L.R.3d 530 (1976); 99 A.L.R.2d
1151 (1965); and 39 A.L.R.2d 606 (1955). See generally, Epley & Armbrust, Legal Limita-
tions on Real Estate Prelicensing Requirements, 7 REAL EST. L.J. 15 (1971).
4. The last MONTANA LAW REVIEW article discussing real estate brokers appeared in
1946, Comment, May A Real Estate Broker in Montana Collect A Commission Orally
Promised Him? 7 MONT. L. REV. 28 (1946).
5. See infra notes 12-42 and accompanying text. The court in Diehl and Assocs., Inc.
v. Houtchens, 173 Mont. 372, 567 P.2d 930 (1977) set forth all the dispositive language of a
listing agreement.
6. See infra notes 43-72 and accompanying text.
7. See intra notes 73-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the law of buy-
sell's. See, e.g.,, Maxted v. Barrett, - Mont. - , 643 P.2d 1161 (1982) and Fisherty v.
Hensley, 164 Mont. 525, 529 P.2d 1389 (1975).
8. These usually include an installment land contract, a quit-claim deed (where the
buyer relinquishes all interest in the property to the seller, which is to be filed if the buyer
defaults), a warranty deed (seller to buyer-to be filed after the final payment is made), a
notice of purchaser's interest and escrow receipts. The notice of purchaser's interest is filed
at the County Clerk and Recorder's office to place the purchaser's name in the chain of title.
See, e.g.,, Chadwick v. Giberson, - Mont. _ 618 P.2d 1213 (1980) (court notes that a
notice of purchaser's interest was placed of record) and Johnson v. Doran, 167 Mont. 501,
540 P.2d 306 (1975) (court notes that a "notice of sale" or "notice of interest" was placed of
record). The escrow receipt is usually included when a third party institution will be holding
the papers pending final payment by the buyers. It usually lists the contents of the escrow.
2
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above steps.' The last part of the article proposes a listing agree-
ment to maximize the broker's chances of recovering a
commission. 0
II. THE LISTING AGREEMENT-THE BROKER'S EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACT
A broker's services are usually engaged by the seller signing a
listing agreement which may be exclusive," general, or open 2 or
may involve a multiple listing" where the listing will be circulated
to all members of the multiple listing service. The employment
contract will occasionally provide for a "net listing," the effect of
which is that the buyer pays the broker's commission; since the
sale is to "net" the seller a certain sum, whatever amount exceeds
that sum goes to the realtor.1 4
A. Statute of Frauds
The broker's authority to buy and sell real estate does not fall
within the common law statute of frauds, but many states, includ-
9. See infra notes 95-141 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 142-75 and accompanying text.
11. In an exclusive listing, only one broker has the right to sell the property. The
following Montana cases involve exclusive listings: Nardi v. Smalley, - Mont. -, 643
P.2d 228 (1982); Payne v. Buechler, - Mont. - , 628 P.2d 646 (1981); Assoc'd. Agency
of Bozeman, Inc. v. Pasha, - Mont. -, 625 P.2d 38 (1981); Lyle v. Moore, - Mont.
- 599 P.2d 336 (1979); Carnell v. Watson, 176 Mont. 344, 578 P.2d 308 (1978); McDon-
ald and Co. v. Fishtail Creek Ranch Ltd., 175 Mont. 53, 572 P.2d 195 (1977); Diehl and
Assocs., Inc. v. Houtchens, 173 Mont. 372, 567 P.2d 930 (1977); Johnson v. Doran, 167 Mont.
501, 540 P.2d 306 (1975); Lapke v. Hunt, 151 Mont. 450, 443 P.2d 493 (1968); Reilly v. Maw,
146 Mont. 145, 402 P.2d 440 (1965); Quitmeyer v. Theroux, 144 Mont. 302, 395 P.2d 511
(1959); Ward v. Mattuschek, 134 Mont. 307, 330 P.2d 971 (1958); Platt & Heath Co. v.
Wilmer, 87 Mont. 382, 288 P. 1021 (1930); Laux v. Hogl, 45 Mont. 445, 123 P. 949 (1912)
(exclusive agency to sell stock); Blankenship v. Decker, 34 Mont. 292, 85 P. 1035 (1906).
12. In a general or open listing, more than one broker has the right to sell the prop-
erty. The following Montana cases involve open listings: Barrett v. Ballard, -, Mont.
-, 622 P.2d 180 (1980); Martin v. Vincent, - Mont. -, 593 P.2d 45 (1979);
Stromberg v. Seaton Ranch Co., 160 Mont. 293, 502 P.2d 41 (1972); Hart v. Billings Pub.
Stockyards, 157 Mont. 345, 486 P.2d 120 (1971); Wood v. Strodtbeck, 142 Mont. 180, 382
P.2d 170 (1963) (original exclusive listing changed to general listing); Flinders v. Gilbert, 141
Mont. 442, 378 P.2d 385 (1963); Cobb v. Warren, 64 Mont. 10, 208 P. 928 (1922); Newman v.
Dunleavy, 51 Mont. 149, 149 P. 970 (1915).
13. The following Montana cases involve multiple listing services: White v. Lobdell,
- Mont. -, 638 P.2d 1057 (1982); Mather v. Dunstan, - Mont. -, 622 P.2d 677
(1981); Van Ettinger v. Pappin, 180 Mont. 1, 588 P.2d 988 (1978); Borgmann v. Diehl, 155
Mont. 458, 473 P.2d 529 (1970).
14. See, e.g., Bradt v. Strout Realty, 478 F. Supp. 1259 (D.C. Mont. 1979); Wright v.
Bowlus, 62 Mont. 322, 205 P. 210 (1922); Cobb v. Warren, 64 Mont. 10, 208 P. 928 (1922);
Wright Land and Inv. Co. v. Even, 57 Mont. 1, 186 P. 681 (1919); Shober v. Blackford, 46
Mont. 194, 127 P. 329. (1912).
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ing Montana, have enacted statutes requiring these agreements to
be in writing.15 Because the provisions of the statute requiring that
the broker's authority be in writing are mandatory,16 an action on
a quantum meruit basis (for the reasonable value of the realtor's
services) must fail, as it would have the effect of nullifying the
statute.1 7 The lack of a written agreement vitiates any cause of ac-
tion the broker may have had for a commission."8 However, an
agreement to secure a lessee's or optionee20 is not within the stat-
ute nor are agreements between brokers to divide commissions.2"
It has been held that several writings may be taken together to
comply with the statute.2 It presently appears to be an open ques-
tion in Montana whether a check given to the realtor by the seller
would satisfy the statute, although in one case the court hinted at
this possibility.2" The fact that the check is executed after the bro-
ker's services have been rendered is no obstacle,24 and it is reason-
able that the seller's personal check with sufficient information
noted on it to satisfy the statute would form a sound basis for the
broker's commission suit, in the absence of any other written
15. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-903(1)(e)(1981).
16. Cobb v. Warren, 69 Mont. 10, 208 P. 928 (1922). See Meech v. Cure, 165 Mont. 49,
525 P.2d 546 (1974) and Dick v. King, 73 Mont. 456, 236 P. 1093 (1925).
One author urges that brokers without a written listing agreement should be able to
rely on equitable estoppel to overcome the defense of the statute of frauds, Oral Employ-
ment Contracts and Equitable Estoppel: The Real Estate Broker as Victim, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 1503 (1975).
17. Reilly v. Maw, 146 Mont. 145, 405 P.2d 440 (1965). See Featherman v. Kennedy,
122 Mont. 256, 200 P.2d 243 (1941).
18. Roscow v. Bara, 114 Mont. 246, 135 P.2d 364 (1943); Gantt v. Harper, 82 Mont.
393, 267 P. 296 (1928); Skinner v. Red Lodge Brewing Co., 79 Mont. 292, 256 P. 173 (1927).
But see Deimler v. Ostler, - Mont. - , 651 P.2d 41 (1982) (where a broker was granted
a commission even though no listing was signed, when the sellers agreed to pay the commis-
sion in the buy-sell).
19. O'Neill v. Wall, 103 Mont. 388, 62 P.2d 672 (1936).
20. Kramer v. Schmidt, 62 Mont. 568, 206 P. 620 (1922).
21. Reilly v. Maw, 146 Mont. 145, 405 P.2d 440 (1965). See also Awberry v. Schmidt,
65 Mont. 265, 211 P. 346 (1922) (an agreement to divide the commission in the sale of land
covered by a written option contract is not within the statute). See generally Annot., 71
A.L.R.3d 586 (1976) and Gulitz, Broker's Responsibilities in Co-op Sales; Whose Agent is
He?, 10 REAL ESTATE L.J. 126 (1981).
22. Hughes v. Melby, 135 Mont. 415, 340 P.2d 511 (1959); Gantt v. Harper, 86 Mont.
69, 281 P. 915 (1929). Cf. Ward v. Mattuschek, 134 Mont. 307, 330 P.2d 971 (1958) (two
letters and a check were sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds requirement that an agree-
ment to sell land be in writing).
23. Reilly v. Maw, 146 Mont. 145, 149, 405 P.2d 440, 443 (1965) ("[Njor have plaintiffs
relied upon [the check's] execution as being such a written memorandum as would satisfy
the statute of frauds. We make no further comment thereon for these reasons"). See also
Lewis v. Starlin, 127 Mont. 474, 267 P.2d 127 (1954) (where the court held that a check with
"payment land" noted thereon was not sufficient to satisfy the statute).
24. Gantt v. Harper, 86 Mont. 69, 281 P. 915 (1929).
4




A question related to the quantum meruit issue is whether
part or full performance of the broker's obligations will serve to
take an oral contract outside the statute. This question has been
raised and addressed in Montana, and the answer seems to be that
full performance by the broker does not vitiate the requirement for
a writing.2 6
B. Parol Evidence
One other aspect of brokers' listing agreements merits discus-
sion. In Payne v. Buechler27 a broker's counsel attempted to intro-
duce parol evidence regarding the execution of the listing, but the
court found it inadmissible because the listing was plain and un-
ambiguous on its face. Nonetheless, in view of two recent cases, the
requirement that an ambiguity exist on the face of the document
before parol evidence will be admitted may no longer exist, and
counsel may be able to introduce such evidence in spite of an un-
ambiguous listing agreement.2 8 This leads one to wonder just what
the status of the parol evidence rule is in Montana. The reason for
the rule is to uphold the sanctity of the written agreement which
supersedes all previous oral negotiations. On the other hand, rigid
application of any rule may result in unjust decisions. It appears
that the present position of the court is that the parol evidence will
be admitted when it is equitable to do so, regardless of whether an
ambiguity exists on the face. A broker's counsel desiring the
favorable use of parol evidence has other means at his disposal to
get the evidence into the record. One exception to the codified pa-
rol evidence rule is that other evidence may be considered when a
"mistake or imperfection of the writing is put in issue by the
pleadings. '29 If there is a substantial controversy regarding the in-
25. See generally Annot., 9 A.L.R.4th 1009 (1981).
26. Hart v. Billings Pub. Stockyards, 157 Mont. 345, 486 P.2d 120 (1971); Featherman
v. Kennedy, 122 Mont. 256, 200 P.2d 243 (1948). Cf. Skinner v. Red Lodge Brewing Co., 79
Mont. 292, 256 P. 173 (1927) (if the statute of frauds requires an agreement to be in writing,
any modification must be in writing also, as long as the contract remains executory).
27. - Mont. - , 628 P.2d 646 (1981).
28. Anderson v. Baker, - Mont. -, 641 P.2d 1035 (1982); Fillbach v. Inland Con-
str. Co., 178 Mont. 374, 584 P.2d 1274 (1978). The parol evidence rule is codified at MoNT.
CODE Ann. § 28-2-905(2) (1981). See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-4-102 (1981) (circumstances
surrounding the execution of the document may be shown).
29. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-905(1)(a) (1981). Cf. Anderson v. Craig, 111 Mont. 182,
189, 108 P.2d 205, 207 (1940) ("If a contract, plain, simple and unambiguous, can be altered
after dispute arises, by testimony that it was the witness' understanding that the contract
meant something different from its plain recitals, then any contract could be similarly al-
tered by parol, and no enforceable agreement could ever be entered into.").
1983]
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terpretation of a listing agreement, for example, which necessitates
a lawsuit to resolve it, it should be relatively easy to draft a com-
plaint or an answer to place an imperfection or mistake of the writ-
ing in issue.
III. THE AGENCY OF THE BROKER
Although the issue of the broker's agency arises periodically in
the cases, the rules and concepts of agency law generally apply.30
Because the seller customarily employs the realtor to sell his prop-
erty, the cases usually describe the broker as the seller's agent.3"
Thus, the broker owes duties to the seller arising out of the agency.
The broker, however, may also owe duties to the buyer that arise
out of the broker's independent interests in the sale of the
property.
A. The Duty of Full Disclosure to the Seller-Principal
One Montana case holds that a broker's fiduciary duty, includ-
ing full disclosure of pertinent facts, arises even before the listing
is signed.2 At first this seems to place a substantial burden on the
agent, but some sellers enter into listing agreements only once or
twice in a lifetime and these uninitiated participants should be
protected. Also, few sellers realize that a buyer may obtain the
property described in the listing by specific performance when no
written agreements have passed directly between the buyer and
seller.33 The failure to provide the seller with a copy of the listing
30. Harbeck v. Orr, - Mont. __, 627 P.2d 1217 (1981) (notice to agent constitutes
notice to principal); McCarty v. Lincoln Green Inc., __ Mont. __, 620 P.2d 1221 (1980)
(principal bound by agent's misrepresentation of location of lots); Middlefork Cattle Co. v.
Todd, 49 Mont. 259, 141 P. 641 (1914) (agent must give up unlawful gains and account to
principal); Laux v. Hogl, 45 Mont. 445, 123 P. 949 (1912) (principal may not discharge agent
to avoid paying commission). Cf. Mead v. Hummel, 58 Ariz. 462, 121 P.2d 423 (1942) (where
realtor was not seller's agent, seller not bound by representations of realtor).
31. Assoc'd. Agency of Bozeman, Inc. v. Pasha, - Mont. -, 625 P.2d 39 (1981);
Reilly v. Maw, 146 Mont. 145, 405 P.2d 440 (1965); Hughes v. Melby, 135 Mont. 415, 340
P.2d 511 (1959). But see Wright v. Lowe, 140 Cal. App. 2d 891, 296 P.2d 34 (1956) where the
court found that the realtor employed by the seller was the buyer's agent in transmitting his
offer to buy. The court was probably influenced by the fact that the seller's total realization
from the sale was a negative $130 and that the seller had only a third-grade education.
Occasionally, however, a broker's services will be sought by a buyer seeking a piece of
property in which case the broker will be the agent of the buyer. See, e.g., Wendy's of Mon-
tana v. Larsen, - Mont. -, 640 P.2d 464 (1982); Ball v. Wright, 118 Colo. 410, 195
P.2d 739 (1948).
32. Lyle v. Moore, - Mont. - , 599 P.2d 336 (1979). Justice Sheehy dissented,
reasoning that the idea of fiduciary relationships was being strained to so hold.
33. Hughes v. Melby, 135 Mont. 415, 340 P.2d 511 (1959).
6
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agreement is fatal to the agent's right to a commission, " but if the
broker provides him with a copy of the listing and the seller subse-
quently loses it, the broker's commission action is not affected. 5
The duty of full disclosure often arises when the agent buys
the seller's property himself.3  In Flemmer v. Ming,3 7 for example,
the agent bought the seller's motel after failing to sell it under the
listing agreement. The agent did not advise the seller, who was in-
experienced in corporate matters, of the difference between the
agent's various closely-held corporations, which were buying the
property. The court, under these circumstances, affirmed a denial
of the agent's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim of fraud. 8
Similarly, in First Trust Co. of Montana v. McKenna,39 the
defendant broker and another person (whom the seller found ob-
jectionable) bought the plaintiff's ranch after failing to find any
other buyers. Within eleven days afterward, the land, cattle, hay
and equipment were resold at about a $180,000 profit, in addition
to a $45,000 commission.40 The broker argued that he had no duty
34. Carnell v. Watson, 176 Mont. 344, 578 P.2d 308 (1978) (where the court also cites
Montana authority for the proposition that all subsequent modifications of the listing agree-
ment must be in writing).
35. Assoc'd. Agency of Bozeman, Inc. v. Pasha, - Mont. -, 625 P.2d 38 (1981).
36. Unlike trustees and attorneys, a broker may enter a conflict of interest situation
by buying his principal's property, Comment, Unprofessional Conduct by Real Estate Bro-
kers: Conflict of Interest and Conflict in the Law, 11 PAc. L.J. 821 (1980). See Martin v.
Vincent, __ Mont. -, 593 P.2d 45 (1979) (trial court's dismissal of broker's complaint,
where the brokers attempted to buy the property, because of lack of disclosure reversed and
remanded for further proceedings).
It would seem that the broker's best defense in this situation would be to have the
owner execute a memorandum specifying that he (owner) understood that he is selling the
property to the listing broker.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-51-321(7) (1981) allows the Board of Realty Regulation to sus-
pend or revoke the realtor's license for acting in the dual capacity of broker and undisclosed
principal in a transaction.
For other cases involving the realtor purchasing the property himself, see Lestoque v.
M.R. Mansfield Realty, Inc., 36 Colo. App. 32, 536 P.2d 1146 (1975); Mersky v. Multiple
Listing Bureau of Olympia, Inc., 73 Wash. 2d 225, 437 P.2d 897 (1968) and Batson v. Streh-
low, 68 Cal. 2d 662, 441 P.2d 101, 68 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1968). See also Frisell v. Newman, 71
Wash. 2d 520, 429 P.2d 864 (1967) (broker of member agency of multiple listing bureau who
bought property listed with another member agency had duty of complete disclosure to
seller).
37. - Mont. - , 621 P.2d 1038 (1981).
38. The Flemmer case also demonstrates that the principal may recover punitive dam-
ages against the realtor. See also Johnson v. Doran, 167 Mont. 501, 540 P.2d 306 (1975)
($43,500 in punitive damages deemed not excessive) and Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 952 (1959).
39. - Mont. - , 614 P.2d 1027 (1980).
40. See also Starkweather v. Shaffer, 262 Or. 198, 497 P.2d 358 (1972) (broker buys
principal's property and sells it a short time later for a quick profit). Cf. Becker v. Capwell,
270 Or. 200, 527 P.2d 120 (1974) (broker bought the property prior to the agency relation-
ship and sold it to the principal without disclosing that he owned it; because principal could
show no difference in value between the selling price and actual value, he could recover no
7
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to disclose after producing a ready, willing and able buyer"' with
whom the seller orally agreed to sell the property. The court re-
jected this argument, finding that the broker's duty of full disclos-
ure did not terminate as soon as the broker proposed to buy the
land himself and that the broker's duty continued until he was le-
gally bound to buy the property by the execution of a written
agreement.42
B. The Duty of Disclosure to the Buyer
Several jurisdictions have considered the question of whether
a broker acting as the seller's agent owes a duty to the buyer to
disclose material defects in the property.4 In general, a duty to
disclose information arises:
in cases where the defendant has special knowledge, or means of
knowledge, not open to the plaintiff, and is aware that the plain-
tiff is acting under a misapprehension of facts which would be of
importance to him, and would probably affect his decision.44
A California court applied the foregoing principles in the lead-
ing case of Lingsch v. Savage.4" The Lingsch court imposed a duty
of disclosure on the broker by reasoning that the broker was a
party to the transaction:
The real estate agent or broker representing the seller is a party
to the business transaction. In most instances he has a personal
interest in it and derives a profit from it. Where such an agent or
broker possesses, along with the seller, the requisite knowledge
. . . whether he acquires it from, or independently of, his princi-
pal, he is under the same duty of disclosure. 4"
The court held that the broker's failure to disclose "facts materi-
ally affecting the value or desirability of the property" would
damages).
41. See also Cooke v. Iverson, 94 Idaho 929, 500 P.2d 830 (1972) (agent's fiduciary
relationship did not end upon completion of original contract but continued through entire
transaction).
42. In Crowley v. Rorvig, 61 Mont. 245, 203 P. 496 (1921) a periphoral question in-
volved whether a commission could be sought when two of the purchasers were wives of the
agents. The court stated that the brokers assumed to act as agents of the seller after signing
a listing agreement and found that the purchase contract was voidable at the principal's
option, affirming the trial court's denial of the commission. See Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 1307
(1952).
43. See Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 550 (1966).
44. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 699 (4th ed. 1971).
45. 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963).
46. Id. at 733, 29 Cal Rptr. at 205.
204 [Vol. 44
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render the broker "jointly and severally liable with the seller."'
In Montana the recent decision in Mends v. Dykstra8 extends
the duty of disclosure to residential property transactions. The
Mends court, however, discussed only the seller's duty based on
special knowledge or ready access to material facts. Nonetheless,
the court relied on a California jury instruction imposing the duty
of disclosure on any party to a transaction.4" If the Montana court
finds that the broker is an interested party, then as in California,
the broker will owe a duty of disclosure to the buyer. The court in
Anderson v. Applebury" has already expressed a willingness to
impose such a duty based on "a relation of trust or confidence be-
tween the parties."
A number of other jurisdictions have also held the broker per-
sonally liable for non-disclosure. In Miles v. McSwegin5" a broker
failed to disclose that a house was infested with termites. An Ohio
court held the broker liable for fraud even though the broker
learned of the infestation after the sale. A Washington court cited
with approval a trial court's instruction imposing a duty on the
broker to discover the truth or falsity of information furnished by
the seller.5 2 Failure to do so could amount to negligent misrepre-
sentation or non-disclosure. This conclusion coincides with article
nine of the Code of Ethics of the National Association of Realtors:
The realtor shall avoid exaggeration, misrepresentation, or con-
cealment of pertinent facts. He has an affirmative obligation to
discover adverse factors that a reasonably competent and diligent
investigation would disclose."
A simple conclusion may be reached from this analysis: although
the Montana case law is not developed, to avoid liability the bro-
ker would be wise to scrupulously disclose material defects to the
buyer.
C. The Double Agent
Several cases discuss the possibility of double agency, viewing
the broker as agent for both the buyer and seller. In Courtney v.
Continental Land and Cattle Co." the court found that a letter in
47. Id.
48. - Mont. -, 637 P.2d 502 (1981).
49. Id. at -, 637 P.2d at 506 (citing BAJI 12:36 (6th ed. 1977)).
50. 173 Mont. 411, 567 P.2d 951 (1977).
51. 58 Ohio St. 2d 97, 388 N.E.2d 161 (1979).
52. Brown v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 53 Wash. 2d 142, 332 P.2d 228 (1958).
53. Code of Ethics of the Nat'l. Ass'n. of Realtors, art. 9 (1979).
54. 17 Mont. 394, 43 P. 185 (1896).
1983] 205
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which the plaintiff admitted he was acting as agent of both parties
was legally admissible. The court apparently accepted the double
agency premise. Another case rejected non-disclosure of a dual
agency as a defense on a claim for a commission. The court stated
that an agreement to pay for services cannot be avoided on the
assertion that another person has agreed by separate contract to
pay for the same services. It appears, however, that this holding
was later refined in a ninth circuit case. The court held that where
the agent had no discretionary power to negotiate the sale but was
merely acting to bring the principals together so they could inde-
pendently contract, the agent could recover from both principals, if
both had agreed to pay him."
The Realtors' Code of Ethics does not prohibit dual agency if
full disclosure is made to all parties, 7 and listing forms discussed
in recent Montana cases generally allow the broker to accept com-
pensation from both parties in case of an exchange.58 Nonetheless,
it may be a practical impossibility to effectively represent two com-
peting interests in the case of a sale. The owner is attempting to
obtain the highest price possible for his property and the pur-
chaser is endeavoring to buy it at the lowest possible price. A bro-
ker negotiating the sale will probably advocate each side at some
point in the transaction to reach a common figure. Thus, an agent
attempting to collect fees from both parties as representing each
principal's best interest is treading on shifting legal ground.59
D. Agent's Authority
An agent does not enjoy general authority but is only author-
ized to do what is specifically mandated by his contract of employ-
55. Childs v. Ptomey, 17 Mont. 502, 43 P. 714 (1896). See generally Annot., 4
A.L.R.3d 224 (1965).
56. McLure v. Luke, 154 F. 647 (9th Cir. 1907).
57. Gulitz, Broker's Responsibilities in Co-op Sales: Whose Agent is He? 10 REAL
EST. L.J. 126, 131 (1981). See also Marmis v. Solot Co., 117 Ariz. 499, 573 P.2d 899 (1977)
(dual representation of buyer and seller without full disclosure approved) and Warren v.
Mangels Realty, 23 Ariz. App. 318, 533 P.2d 78 (1975) (seller's agent may not act on behalf
of buyer without seller's consent).
58. See, e.g., Diehl and Assocs. v. Houtchens, 173 Mont. 372, 567 P.2d 930 (1977); See
also Homefinders v. Lawrence, 80 Idaho 543, 335 P.2d 893 (1959) (where the court upholds a
dual agency relationship on an exchange because such agency was disclosed to both parties).
59. See Ledirk Amusement Co. v. Scheckner, 133 N.J. Eq. 602, 33 A.2d 894 (1943) and
McLure v. Luke, 154 F. 647 (9th Cir. 1907); Cf. Norville v. Palant, 25 Ariz. App. 606, 545
P.2d 454 (1976) (the continuation of a pre-existing relationship between the agent and the
buyer militated strongly against a broker-principal relationship between the seller and
agent) and Deimler v. Ostler, - Mont. - , 541 P.2d 41 (1982) (seller's contention that
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ment.60 This authority may be given through a series of letters as
well as through a single document.6 1
In Hughes v. Melby62 the court discussed the question of
whether the listing agreement gave the broker authority to bind
the sellers to an agreement for the sale of their property. The court
reasoned that, since the employment contract authorized the agent
to receive a down payment, he had implied authority to bind his
principals in a sale agreement. Shover v. Dean"3 held that if a list-
ing agreement provides in effect that the broker shall get a com-
mission if the land is sold to parties who become interested in the
land through the realtor's agency, directly or indirectly, and the
broker sets in motion the chain of events culminating in the sale of
the property, it was error for the trial court to award a fee less
than the maximum allowed by the agreement.
IV. THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND AGREEMENT TO SELL
AND PURCHASE
When a prospective buyer wishes to enter a binding agreement
to purchase the seller's property, he usually pays an amount of ear-
nest money and executes a document entitled an "Earnest Money
Receipt and Agreement to Sell and Purchase," 4 commonly called a
"buy-sell."66
60. Martin v. Vincent, - Mont. -, 593 P.2d 45 (1979). Cf. Gantt v. Harper, 36
Mont. 69, 281 P. 915 (1929) (the court dismissed defendant's claim that it was error to
direct a verdict for the plaintiff broker because there was an issue of fact whether the owner
was a special agent who needs his brother's consent before signing the contract).
61. Newman v. Dunleavy, 51 Mont. 149, 149 P. 970 (1915).
62. 135 Mont. 415, 340 P.2d 511 (1959).
63. 39 Mont. 255, 102 P. 323 (1909).
64. See, e.g., Wendy's of Montana v. Larsen, - Mont. -, 640 P.2d 464 (1982);
Chadwick v. Giberson, - Mont. -, 618 P.2d 1213 (1980); Diehl and Assocs., Inc. v.
Houtchens, 173 Mont. 372, 567 P.2d 930 (1977); Denny v. Brissonneaud, 161 Mont. 468, 506
P.2d 77 (1973).
In the following cases, the court simply termed the buy-sell a "receipt and agreement to
purchase": Martin v. Vincent, - Mont. -, 593 P.2d 45 (1979); Stafford v. Love, 151
Mont. 270, 442 P.2d 190 (1968); Yost Farm Co. v. Cremer, 152 Mont. 200, 447 P.2d 688
(1968); Brown v. Griffin, 150 Mont. 498, 436 P.2d 695 (1968); Lapke v. Hunt, 151 Mont. 450,
443 P.2d 493 (1968).
All obligations under a buy-sell can be terminated by mutual agreement. McDonald and
Co. v. Fishtail Creek Ranch Ltd., 175 Mont. 53, 572 P.2d 195 (1977).
65. See, e.g., Nardi v. Smalley, - Mont. -, 643 P.2d 1228 (1982); White v. Lob-
dell, - Mont. -, 638 P.2d 1057 (1982); McCarty v. Lincoln Green, Inc., - Mont.
- .620 P.2d 1221 (1980); First Trust Co. of Montana v. McKenna, - Mont. - , 614
P.2d 1037 (1980) (referred to as "buy and sell contract"); Maxted v. Stenberg, 166 Mont.
460, 534 P.2d 864 (1975).
A broker. should exercise caution in actively filling in the appropriate spaces or in draft-
ing documents so as not to engage in the practice of law. Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 788 (1957).
See also Shedd, Real Estate Agents and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 10 REAL EST.
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A number of cases have held that a purchaser can require the
seller to specifically perform under the buy-sell," and most buy-
sell's have language granting both buyer and seller the specific per-
formance remedy. 7 A purchaser can make out a stronger case for
specific performance if he can show reliance on the terms of the
buy-sell or grounds giving rise to estoppel." If the parties draft
their own buy-sell, it must contain all the essentials of the con-
tract, or a purchaser's cause of action for specific performance will
fail. 9
Most of these agreements contain provisions that the seller
will furnish the purchaser with an abstract of title, showing mer-
chantable or marketable title,70 or a title insurance policy insuring
vested title in the buyer. If the seller fails to fulfill these obliga-
tions, the buyer's earnest money is returned,71 but if the seller dis-
charges these obligations and the buyer refuses to complete the
sale, the earnest money is forfeited as liquidated damages.72 The
sellers may not force the purchaser to accept their determination
of the merchantability of title, in lieu of an abstract or insurance
policy, 73 and it has been held that the seller's tender of the ab-
stract or title insurance is a condition precedent to the buyer's
L.J. 135 (1981) and Comment, Document Preparation by the Real Estate Broker: How Far
is Far Enough? 14 WILLAMETrE L.J. 975 (1978).
66. Maxted v. Barrett, - Mont. -, 643 P.2d 1161 (1982); Chadwick v. Giberson,
- Mont. -, 618 P.2d 1213 (1980); Walsh v. Ellingson Agency, - Mont. -, 613
P.2d 1381 (1980); Ingalls v. Brady, 180 Mont. 443, 591 P.2d 200 (1979); Yost Farm Co. v.
Cremer, 152 Mont. 200, 447 P.2d 688 (1968); Brown v. Griffin, 150 Mont. 498, 436 P.2d 695
(1968).
It has also been held that a purchaser can obtain specific performance of a buy sell with
an abatement in the purchase price for the portion of the property the seller was unable to
convey. Hart v. Honrud, 131 Mont. 284, 309 P.2d 329 (1957).
67. Several cases involve the seller's seeking specific performance. See, e.g., Golden v.
Frazier, 244 Ga. 685, 261 S.E.2d 703 (1979); Lee v. Desenberg, 2 Mich. App. 365, 139 N.W.2d
916 (1966); Harley E. Rouda & Co. v. Springtime Co., 49 Ohio App. 2d 49, 359 N.E.2d 450
(1975).
68. Maxted v. Stenberg, 166 Mont. 460, 534 P.2d 864 (1975).
69. Dineen v. Sullivan, 123 Mont. 195, 213 P.2d 241 (1949).
70. In Gantt v. Harper, 82 Mont. 393, 267 P. 296 (1928), the court found that "market-
able title" was equivalent to "clear title," which the court interpreted to mean a fee simple
interest in the property. On modern forms there is usually a space provided for the insertion
of mortgages or other encumbrances.
71. Woodbury v. Clermont, 236 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1956); Stafford v. Love, 151 Mont.
270, 442 P.2d 190 (1968).
The title clause may provide that if the seller's title is not merchantable, the earnest
money will be returned to the purchaser and his rights terminated. This kind of clause has
no reference to the situation where the vendor can provide the contracted-for title, but in
bad faith fails to do so. Hart v. Honrud, 131 Mont. 284, 309 P.2d 329 (1957).
72. Wendy's of Montana v. Larsen, - Mont. - , 640 P.2d 464 (1982).
73. Yost Farm Co. v. Cremer. 152 Mont. 200, 447 P.2d 688 (1968).
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making the final payment on the purchase price.7 ' If the buyer
waives the defects in the seller's title and purchases the property,
he cannot later be heard to complain about the defective title.s
When one buy-sell expires or becomes outdated, another can
be entered into between the parties to take later events into ac-
count.7 6 If a buy-sell contains an express provision that its terms
will be of no effect unless a contract for deed is executed within a
specified time, the buyer and seller can nullify the time limitation
by an executed oral agreement to waive it.77
Most of these agreements to sell and purchase contain an "in-
dependent investigation" clause in which the buyer states that he
has investigated the property on his own and is not relying on any
representations made by others.78 While a seller cannot base a suc-
cessful motion for summary judgment on one of these clauses 7 9
such a clause may at least prevent a buyer from claiming damages
for fraudulent misrepresentation of the amount of land contained
in the parcel he bought.80
A realtor's attempted reliance on an independent investigation
clause in a suit regarding the misrepresentation of lot locations was
struck down in McCarty v. Lincoln Green, Inc.81 because the pur-
74. Brown v. Griffin, 150 Mont. 498, 436 P.2d 695 (1968). In Brown the purchaser's
tender of performance was excused because of the seller's failure to provide the abstract or
title policy. Similarly, in Chadwick v. Giberson, - Mont. -, 618 P.2d 1213 (1980), the
plaintiff purchaser was excused from tendering the balance of the down payment because
the seller could not convey the contracted-for title.
75. Van Ettinger v. Pappin, 180 Mont. 1, 588 P.2d 988 (1978). In Van Ettinger the
buy-sell granted an easement to the purchaser and, prior to closing, the buyer determined
that the easement was not for his benefit but closed the sale anyway. On appeal the court
found that the buyer could not subsequently complain about the nonexistence of the
easement.
It should also be kept in mind that a provision in the buy-sell where the broker as-
sumed no responsibility in regard to the title did not insulate a broker from treble damages
liability where he induced the purchasers to enter into the agreement, knowing that they
wanted marketable title to all the land but aware that this could not be delivered. Stafford
v. Love, 151 Mont. 270, 442 P.2d 190 (1968).
Treble damages may be awarded by virtue of MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-51-323(2) (1981).
76. Hollinger v. McMichael, 177 Mont. 144, 580 P.2d 927 (1978).
77. Reilly v. Maw, 146 Mont. 145, 405 P.2d 440 (1965).
78. See, e.g., Schultz v. Peake, 178 Mont. 261, 583 P.2d 425 (1978).
79. Jenkins v. Hillard, - Mont. -, 647 P.2d 354 (1982); Bails v. Gar, 171 Mont.
342, 558 P.2d 458 (1976), which is discussed in Note, Vendor's Representations Made
Outside the Contract for Deed Held Against Him, 38 MONT. L. REv. 419 (1977).
80. Schultz v. Peake, 178 Mont. 261, 583 P.2d 425 (1978) (buyers were told the prop-
erty consisted of 13 acres when it actually consisted of only 1.3 acres). However, in McCarty
v. Lincoln Green, Inc., - Mont. - , 629 P.2d 1221 (1980) the court stated that the
holding in Schultz was also based on the fact that the buyers had inspected the property
numerous times.
81. __ Mont. -. 629 P.2d 1221 (1980).
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chasers had inspected the wrong parcel. A real estate agent is best
advised to guard against a misrepresentation suit by not relying on
the clause itself but on the buyer's actual inspection of the correct
property.52
V. THE BROKER'S COMMISSION
A. Montana Law
The vast majority of Montana cases involve realtors suing for
commissions allegedly due. Characteristically, it is this aspect of
the law where the least consistency appears, and an attorney seek-
ing authority in aid of a broker's case will not be hard-pressed to
find some support for his position.
The starting point for discussion is the premise that the bro-
ker has earned his commission when he has produced a buyer
ready, willing and able to purchase the seller's property on the
conditions specified in the listing agreement.83 Language incorpo-
rating this idea is often found in the listing agreement.84 The term
"able" in the phrase "ready, willing and able" has been interpreted
to mean financially able to complete the purchase.8 5
An agent can forfeit his commission by violating any of the
provisions of the Real Estate License Act.86 Similarly, a broker's
unilateral alteration of the listing agreement nullifies any right to a
commission even though the alterations are later stricken.8 7 If an
agent contracts to procure a purchaser but the prospective pur-
chaser only executes a lease and option to buy (and does not exer-
82. Van Ettinger v. Pappin, 180 Mont. 1, 588 P.2d 988 (1978) (because buyers had
made an independent investigation, they were barred as a matter of law from claiming reli-
ance on the realtor's alleged misrepresentations); Anderson v. Applebury, 172 Mont. 411,
567 P.2d 951 (1977) (plaintiff purchaser's cause of action for fraud and misrepresentation
under the Montana Real Estate License Act was rejected where they had inspected the
property themselves). See generally Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 550 (1966).
83. First Trust Co. of Montana v. McKenna, - Mont. -, 614 P.2d 1031 (1980);
McDonald and Co. v. Fishtail Creek Ranch Ltd., 175 Mont. 53, 572 P.2d 195 (1977); Roscow
v. Bara, 114 Mont. 246, 135 P.2d 364 (1943); Gantt v. Harper, 86 Mont. 69, 281 P. 915
(1929). But see Wood v. Strodtbeck, 142 Mont. 180, 382 P.2d 170 (1963) (where court af-
firmed decision that included statements that a broker must do more than produce a buyer
who says he is ready and willing-buyer must be obligated to buy under an enforceable
agreement).
84. See, e.g., Diehl & Assocs., Inc. v. Houtchens, 173 Mont. 372, 567 P.2d 930 (1977)
and Anderson v. Craig, 111 Mont. 182, 108 P.2d 205 (1940).
85. Wood v. Strodtbeck, 142 Mont. 180, 382 P.2d 170 (1963); Anderson v. Craig, 111
Mont. 182, 108 P.2d 205 (1940).
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cise the option), the broker forfeits his commission;88 however,
where a broker is engaged to secure a lease or option but instead
causes a third party to enter into a contract of sale, he is still enti-
tled to his commission. "
If a broker has been given a non-exclusive listing, it has been
held that he must be the procuring cause of the sale and not just
introduce the seller to the eventual buyer.90 On the other hand, if a
broker has an exclusive listing and a sale of the property occurs
within the period of the listing, a presumption arises that the bro-
ker made the sale.91 Some listings provide that the realtor will re-
ceive a commission for a certain period of time after the expiration
of the listing where the broker places the eventual buyer in contact
with the seller during the listing period,92 and if no time is speci-
fied, a reasonable time will be implied."
A complaint seeking a commission should allege that the
plaintiff is licensed to deal in real estate in Montana. 4 If an agent
attempts to attach the proceeds of a house sale to satisfy his com-
mission, he must allege by affidavit facts showing the seller's intent
to dispose of the money and defraud the agent and that a debt is
owed when the affidavit is filed.98
88. Roscow v. Bara, 114 Mont. 246, 135 P.2d 364 (1943). See also Anderson v. Craig,
111 Mont. 182, 108 P.2d 205 (1940) (court found that the agreement executed by buyer and
seller was not an option but a sale and granted the plaintiff broker his commission). See
generally Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 1430 (1972) and Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 321 (1970).
89. O'Neill v. Wall, 103 Mont. 388, 62 P.2d 672 (1936).
90. Flinders v. Gilbert, 141 Mont. 492, 378 P.2d 385 (1963); Cobb v. Warren, 64 Mont.
10, 208 P. 928 (1922). But see Stromberg v. Seaton Ranch Co., 160 Mont. 293, 502 P.2d 41
(1972) (where the court rejected the argument that, under the nonexclusive listing agree-
ment there, the broker had to establish that his efforts were the procuring cause of the sale).
91. McDonald & Co. v. Fishtail Creek Ranch Ltd. Partnership, 175 Mont. 53, 572 P.2d
195 (1977).
92. See, e.g., Nardi v. Smalley, - Mont. - , 643 P.2d 228 (1982) (90 days); As-
soc'd. Agency of Bozeman, Inc. v. Pasha, - Mont. - , 625 P.2d 38 (1981) (180 days);
Diehl and Assocs., Inc. v. Houtchens, 173 Mont. 372, 567 P.2d 930 (1977) (90 days); and
Flinders v. Gilbert, 141 Mont. 492, 378 P.2d 385 (1963) (180 days).
93. Stromberg v. Seaton Ranch Co., 160 Mont. 293, 502 P.2d 41 (1972).
94. MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-51-401 (1981). In Deimler v. Ostler, Mont. -, 651
P.2d 41 (1982), the court found that where the undisputed facts showed that the plaintiff
was a licensed broker at the time the action arose, the statute was satisfied. In Nardi v.
Smalley, - Mont. - , 643 P.2d 228 (1982), the plaintiff did not allege that he was a
licensed broker in his initial complaint but the court's pre-trial order amended the com-
plaint to state that he was. The plaintiff also introduced his broker's license as his first
exhibit at trial.
See also Platt & Heath Co. v. Wilmer, 87 Mont. 382, 288 P. 1021 (1930) (complaint was
"clearly defective" in failing to allege that plaintiff was a licensed broker but since defen-
dant did not challenge plaintiff's capacity to sue by special demurrer or answer, defendant
waived the defect).
95. Mather v. Dunstan, Mont. ., 622 P.2d 677 (1981).
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1. The Diehl Decision and Its Aftermath
A better view of when the right to a commission accrues may
be gained by examining the more recent cases because, as will be
seen, the "ready, willing and able" requirement is only the starting
point. One of the most-cited cases is Diehl & Associates, Inc. v.
Houtchens 6 In Diehl the plaintiff broker sued for a commission,
arguing that he had fully performed his obligations undertaken in
the listing agreement 7 by obtaining the signatures of the prospec-
tive purchasers on a buy-sell. The broker contended that the fail-
ure to complete the sale was the seller's fault and not his.
In a result-oriented opinion, the court focused on the words
"sell or exchange"98 in the sentence of the listing describing the
scope of the plaintiff's agency. The court reasoned that, since no
"sale" had taken place, 99 plaintiff had no right to a commission. In
so holding, the court ignored the listing clause providing that the
agent earned his commission on the production of a ready and will-
ing buyer. The court also distinguished two sorts of brokerage
contracts:
We note the distinction between a brokerage contract which re-
quires a broker to merely find a purchaser and a brokerage con-
tract which requires a broker to sell, make or effect a sale. In the
first case the broker earns his commission when he procures a
96. 173 Mont. 372, 567 P.2d 930 (1977).
97. The listing agreement is set out in full in the opinion. The listing provided that
the seller agreed to pay a commission if the broker found a buyer ready and willing to enter
into a deal at the listed price and terms or at such other price and terms that would be
acceptable to the seller.
98. For a case discussing the right to a commission when the broker is authorized to
sell or exchange the property, and an exchange instead of a sale takes place, see Apple v.
Henry, 66 Mont. 244, 213 P. 444 (1923).
99. The court thus holds that the execution of a buy-sell does not constitute a sale.
There is, however, authority to the contrary. See Assoc'd. Agency of Bozeman, Inc. v. Pasha,
- Mont. -, 625 P.2d 38, 40 (1981) ("Neither [party], however, signed the earnest
money receipt and agreement to sell and purchase necessary to complete the sale"); Stafford
v. Love, 151 Mont. 270, 280, 442 P.2d 190, 195 (1968) (court rejected the argument that a
buy-sell was not a contract for the sale of land with this language: "The Agreement to Sell
and Purchase constituted a contract for the sale of land .. "); and Martin v. Vincent, -
Mont. -, 583 P.2d 46 (1979) (court repeatedly refers to the buy-sell as a "land sale
contract").
The majority rule is that, where there are no special conditions precedent to the earning
of a commission, the broker should get his commission even though the buyer defaults on
the contract. There are, however, an increasing number of jurisdictions that hold to the
contrary. Annot., 12 A.L.R.4th 1083, 1088 (1982).
What would have been the result in Diehl if the listing had provided that the brokers
were to be paid out of the first proceeds of the sale? See Brockway-Mecklenburg Co. v.
Hilderman, 90 Mont. 317, 2 P.2d 1018 (1931). The buyer in Diehl deposited $500 as earnest
money toward the purchase of the property.
16
ontana Law Review, Vol. 44 [1983], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/3
1983] REAL ESTATE AGENT
buyer able, ready and willing to purchase on the seller's terms. A
broker employed to sell or effect a sale does not earn his commis-
sion until he completes the sale. Completion of the sale, where
real property is involved, amounts to payment of the purchase
price and conveyance of title.100
The cases following Diehl have all but ignored this reasoning.
About a year after Diehl was handed down, the court con-
fronted a similar situation in Hollinger v. McMichael.101 In Hollin-
ger the plaintiff broker and defendant seller executed a listing
agreement virtually identical to that construed in Diehl, employing
the broker to "sell or exchange" the property.102 The prospective
buyers and the seller executed two buy-sell's, but the seller failed
to complete the sale. Plaintiff sued for a commission and the court
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the
plaintiff. The court did not examine the language of the listing
which it had relied on so heavily in Diehl'0 s but instead stated that
the plaintiff had earned his commission under the listing by
presenting defendant with a ready, willing and able buyer.
A closer look at these two cases indicates that in both the dis-
positive language in the listing was identical; in both, buy-sell's
were signed, and in both the sale was not concluded. Yet in Diehl
the broker's commission was denied, and in Hollinger the broker
was granted summary judgment for his commission. The two hold-
100. 173 Mont. at 379, 567 P.2d at 935. The court cited the early case of O'Neill v.
Wall, 103 Mont. 388, 62 P.2d 672 (1936) for the proposition that a sale of real estate does
not occur until all payments have been made. Two previous cases, involving net listings, had
similarly so held: Wright v. Bowlus, 62 Mont. 322, 205 P. 210 (1922) and Wright Land &
Inv. Co. v. Even, 57 Mont. 1, 186 P. 68 (1919).
In Union Interchange, Inc. v. Parker, 138 Mont. 348, 357 P.2d 339 (1960), the court
notes that several licensed brokers testified that they never accepted a fee until a sale was
completed but there is no further explanation of this testimony.
Diehl was remanded for a determination by the district court of any expenses incurred
by the broker related to the sale, which the broker was entitled to under a provision in the
buy-sell. On remand, the sellers were awarded attorney fees, by virtue of the reciprocal at-
torney fee statute (MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-704 (1981)), both for the suit and for the bro-
ker's second appeal on the attorney fee award. Diehl & Assocs. v. Houtchens, 180 Mont. 48,
588 P.2d 1014 (1979).
101. 177 Mont. 144, 580 P.2d 927 (1978).
102. The court's opinion does not set forth the listing, but an examination of the par-
ties' briefs indicates that the language of the agreement was very similar to the listing agree-
ment in Diehl.
103. The court cited Diehl for the proposition that a broker is entitled to a commis-
sion when he produces a ready, willing and able purchaser on the terms specified in the
listing but failed to address the actual Diehl holding.
It has long been the law in Montana that the agent may not sue the prospective pur-
chaser who defaults. Brockway-Mecklenburg Co. v. Hilderman, 90 Mont. 317, 2 P.2d 1018
(1931). See generally Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 1395 (1970).
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ings are irreconcilable.""
Diehl and Hollinger were cited and discussed in First Trust
Co. of Montana v. McKenna,105 where the court stated that a close
reading of the cases revealed that the rule of law set was to protect
a broker who has produced an eligible buyer. This language is
questionable with regard to the Diehl holding because there the
court denied the broker a commission on the grounds that the exe-
cution of the buy-sell did not not constitute a sale.
Diehl was again cited and discussed in Barrett v. Ballard,106 a
case handed down later in the same year as McKenna. In Barrett
as a result of the broker's advertising the sellers' property, the
buyer and seller came together and eventually executed a contract
for deed at a price somewhat less than that called for in the origi-
nal listing.107 The district court awarded the broker a commission
and the supreme court affirmed while distinguishing Diehl in
which no sale took place. The court then stated that the law in
Montana is well settled that the broker need not do everything to
complete the sale but only be responsible for bringing the parties
together ' °1 which, of course, flies squarely in the face of the Diehl
holding. The Barrett court also found that the district court did
not err in failing to give instructions based on Diehl's distinction
between the listing which requires the broker to find a purchaser
and one which requires him to make the sale. The court, however,
did not analyze the language of the listing itself as it did in
Diehl.109
About three months after Barrett was decided, the court again
had occasion to comment on Diehl, this time in Associated Agency
104. Note that in Diehl the buyer failed to complete the sale whereas in Hollinger the
seller failed to follow through. The broker's right to a commission should not turn on such a
fine distinction.
The only other possible way to distinguish the two cases is that in Hollinger financing
commitments from the FHA were required and obtained prior to closing, whereas in Diehl
there was no provision for financing commitments to be obtained.
Hollinger was remanded for an evidentiary hearing on attorney fees, and the plaintiff
was successful in obtaining fees for work required for the appeal, which the district court
had failed to award him. Hollinger v. McMichael, __ Mont. -, 594 P.2d 1120 (1979).
105. - Mont. , 614 P.2d 1027 (1980).
106. - Mont. -, 622 P.2d 180 (1980).
107. The listing was for $106,000 and the contract for deed was signed for "some
$70,000." - Mont. at -, 622 P.2d at 182-83.
108. The court cited Shober v. Dean, 39 Mont. 255, 102 P. 323 (1909) as the source of
the quotation but did not elaborate on the fact that in Shober the court was addressing
those comments to the question of how to interpret the term "indirectly" in the listing
agreement. The listing agreement in Barrett did not contain the word "indirectly".
109. The listing agreement gave the broker the "right to sell" the property, which is
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of Bozeman, Inc. v. Pasha.110 In Pasha, which is the only case de-
cided since Diehl where a broker sued for a commission without an
enforceable agreement between the buyer and seller at the time of
filing the complaint, the trial court awarded the plaintiff his com-
mission and was affirmed on appeal. The court found no error in
the lower court's refusal to give instructions to the effect that a
broker is never entitled to a commission until a binding written
agreement is signed and the sale completed. The court also "ex-
panded" the Diehl holding with the following language:
We acknowledge that this Court'has stated that a broker em-
ployed to "sell or effect a sale" and exchange (as is the case here)
does not earn his commission until the purchase price is paid, ti-
tle is conveyed and the sale is completed. In an expansion of this
holding, however, we must also conclude that a broker is still en-
titled to his commission even if the sale is not completed if a
ready, willing and able buyer is procured and the failure to consu-
mate was solely due to the wrongful acts or interference of the
seller."'
It would be more accurate to say that the court "retreated" from
its harsh Diehl holding.
Nardi v. Smalley1 2 involved a listing agreement very similar
to that in Diehl and Hollinger, including the "sell or exchange"
language. The court granted the broker his commission where the
buyer and seller entered into a contract for deed within the stipu-
lated ninety-day period after the listing expired. Without citing or
distinguishing Diehl, the court stated that the contract for deed
was a "sale" because the buyer received an equitable interest in
the property in return for the obligation to pay the purchase price.
B. Other Jurisdictions
Most jurisdictions in the United States follow the same ad
hoc, case-by-case approach as is followed by the Montana Supreme
Court with predictably inconsistent results. Other courts, however,
have taken a firmer stance in outlining just what it is that a broker
must do to gain a commission.11
110. __ Mont. -, 625 P.2d 38 (1981).
111. Id. at 43.
112. - Mont. -, 643 P.2d 228 (1982).
113. See, e.g., Lee v. Desenberg, 2 Mich. App. 365, 139 N.W.2d 916 (1966) (in Michi-
gan the owner becomes liable to the broker when the broker produces an enforceable con-
tract and the owner neglects or refuses to complete the deal, sells to another, or takes such
action as may prevent the completion of the transaction); Harley E. Rouda and Co. v.
Springtime Co., 49 Ohio App. 2d 49, 359 N.E.2d 450 (1975) (a broker is entitled to his
commission after the seller enters into an enforceable written contract with the buyer, even
1983] 21.5
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In the landmark case of Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson'14
the Supreme Court of New Jersey broke with nearly a century of
precedent and set out the conditions a broker must fulfill:
When a broker is engaged by an owner of property to find a
purchaser for it, the broker earns his commission when (a) he
produces a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy on the terms
fixed by the owner, (b) the purchaser enters into a binding con-
tract with the owner to do so, and (c) the purchaser completes
the transaction by closing the title in accordance with the provi-
sions of the contract.. . . In short, in the absence of default by
the seller, the broker's right to commission against the seller
comes into existence only when his buyer performs in accordance
with the contract of sale." 5
1)
The court continued by saying that whenever there is substantial
inequality of bargaining power, any provision to the contrary of the
above in a brokerage contract prepared by the broker would be
unenforceable. 116
A few other states have adopted the Ellsworth Dobbs rationale
entirely. Oregon was the first state to follow suit in 1971,7 with
Kansas"18 and Massachusetts" 9 not far behind.
In three states the legislatures have seen fit to intervene by
enacting legislation addressed to the broker's commission issue. 20
The Georgia statute simply states that the broker's commission is
earned when he finds a ready, willing and able purchaser who of-
fers to buy on the owner's terms.' 2 ' The Colorado statute requires
though the transaction is never consumated).
114. 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843.
115. Id. at 551, 236 A.2d at 855.
116. Id. at 555, 236 A.2d at 857-58.
117. Brown v. Grimm, 258 Or. 55, 481 P.2d 63 (1971). See Comment, Right of a Bro-
ker to a Real Estate Commission, 8 WILLAMErE L.J. 84 (1972).
118. Winkelman v. Allen, 214 Kan. 22, 519 P.2d 1377 (1974) (citing cases from other
jurisdictions approving Ellsworth Dobbs).
119. Tristram's Landing, Inc. v. Wait, 367 Mass. 622, 327 N.E.2d 727 (1975). The
court also noted, as did the Ellsworth Dobbs court, that any language to the contrary would
be scrutinized carefully and if the agreement was "not fairly made," it may be unconsciona-
ble or against public policy.
North Dakota has adopted Ellsworth Dobbs insofar as it holds that a seller is not es-
topped from denying a prospective purchaser's financial ability by executing a contract to
sell to the purchaser. Goetz v. Anderson, 274 N.W.2d 175 (N.D. 1978).
120. Note, Let the Seller Beware-Unconscionability and the Real Estate Broker's
Employment Contract, 5 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 59, 63 (1974).
121. GA. CODE ANN. § 4-213 (1982) provides:
The fact that property is placed in the hands of a broker to sell shall not pre-
vent the owner from selling, unless otherwise agreed. The broker's commissions
are earned when during the agency, he finds a purchaser ready, able, and willing
to buy, and who actually offers to buy on the terms stipulated by the owner.
[Vol. 44
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the purchase to be "consumated" or else defeated by the refusal or
neglect of the owner before a Colorado broker is entitled to a com-
mission.1 22 In Maryland, absent a contrary agreement, the commis-
sion is earned when the buyer and seller execute a written contract
even though the buyer does not perform, unless such non-perform-
ance was due to the broker's actions.1 2
3
VI. A PROPOSED LISTING AGREEMENT 
1 2
In view of the problems raised by the Montana case law, the
following exclusive listing agreement 125 is proposed in an attempt
to maximize the realtor's chances of obtaining a commission and at
the same time to clarify the parties' rights. The contracting parties
122. COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-61-201 (1978) provides:
No real estate agent or broker is entitled to a commission for finding a pur-
chaser who is ready, willing, and able to complete the purchase of real estate as
proposed by the owner until the same is consumated or is defeated by the refusal
or neglect of the owner to consumate the same as agreed upon.
123. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 14-105 (1974) provides:
In the absence of special agreement to the contrary, if a real estate broker
employed to sell, buy, lease, or otherwise negotiate an estate, or a mortgage or
loan secured by the property, procures in good faith a purchaser, vendor, lessor,
lessee, mortgagor, mortgagee, borrower, or lender, as the case may be, and the
person procured is accepted by the employer and enters into a valid, binding and
enforceable written contract, in terms acceptable to the employer, of a sale,
purchase, lease, mortgage, loan, or other contract, as the case may be, and the
contract is accepted by the employer and signed by him, the broker is deemed to
have earned the customary or agreed commission. He has earned the commission
regardless of whether or not the contract entered into is performed, unless the
performance of the contract is prevented, hindered, or delayed by any act of the
broker.
See, e.g., DeFranceaux Realty Group, Inc. v. Leeth, 283 Md. 611, 391 A.2d 1209 (1978) and
Wyand v. Patterson Agency, Inc., 271 Md. 617, 319 A.2d 308 (1974).
124. The property description and terms of sale will necessarily vary with each listing,
so these were omitted. Also, boilerplate provisions regarding entry onto the property by the
customer and the termination date of the listing were omitted because they give rise to little
litigation. For examples of these, see Diehl and Assoc. v. Houtchens, 180 Mont. 48, 588 P.2d
1014 (1974).
125. An exclusive listing is desirable because of the presumption that if the property is
sold during the period of the listing, the broker having the listing caused the same. McDon-
ald and Co. v. Fishtail Creek Ranch Ltd., 175 Mont. 53, 572 P.2d 195 (1977).
In Johnson v. Doran, 167 Mont. 501, 540 P.2d 306 (1975), the court affirmed a punitive
damages award of $43,500 from a broker who had attempted to usurp another broker's ex-
clusive listing. See Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 720 (1970) and Kreitzer, Intentional Interference
With Prospective Economic Relationships: A Case for Intentional Tort Recovery for the
California Real Estate Broker, 15 U.S.F. L. REv. 205 (1980-81).
For a suggested nonexclusive brokerage agreement which was drafted to protect the
seller (commission is earned when title closes on terms satisfactory to the seller), see Gold-
stein, When Does a Real Estate Broker Earn His Commission?, 27 PRAc. LAw. 43, 52-53
(1981). For a proposed exclusive listing drafted by laymen in an effort to rid the document
of legalese, see Case & Needles, How to Make Real Estate Documents Readable, 7 REAL
EST. L.J. 320, 329-32 (1979).
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can make the agent's compensation depend on any lawful condi-
tion.12 Nonetheless, the terms of the agreement are extremely im-
portant because the courts will examine them to determine
whether the broker has earned his commission. 2 ' Moreover, if the
broker's attorney prepared the agreement, any ambiguity created
will be interpreted against the broker. 128
Paragraph 1
You and your agents are hereby employed to find a buyer
ready and willing to purchase the property described in this
agreement at the selling price and terms noted or at such other
price and terms as I accept.
Analysis
This paragraph was drafted in an effort to bring the listing
within the scope of a brokerage contract that "requires a broker
merely to find a purchaser" as discussed in Diehl.2 9 The concept
of the broker being employed to "sell or exchange" the property is
completely eliminated, eclipsing any vestiges of Diehl that may
still remain. 30 Inclusion of the "sell or exchange" language is un-
wise because this allows a court to deny the broker his commission
if the buyer defaults on the buy-sell or to postpone the broker's
commission until the final payment is made and title passes. Both
results were approved by the Diehl holding and based on the "sell
or exchange" language.
Also eliminated is the recital of consideration for the listing. 1'
126. Assoc'd. Agency of Bozeman, Inc. v. Pasha, - Mont. -, 625 P.2d 38 (1981).
127. Diehl & Assocs., Inc. v. Houtchens, 173 Mont. 372, 567 P.2d 930 (1977).
128. E.M. Beorke, Inc. v. Williams, 28 Wis. 2d 627, 137 N.W.2d 489 (1965); Ralph
Hockman & Co. v. Fort Stanwix Mfg., 284 F. Supp. 995 (N.D.N.Y. 1967). In Kennedy v.
Roach, 122 N.J. Super. 361, 300 A.2d 570 (1973) the appellate court reversed the trial court
and granted the plaintiff his full commission as agreed by the parties. The court noted that
the plaintiff was a TV repairman who only worked part-time as a real estate salesman and
that the contract of sale was prepared by the seller's attorney.
129. See also Labbe v. Cyr, 150 Me. 342, 111 A.2d 330 (1954) where the court stated
that a broker employed to sell, as opposed to a broker employed to find a purchaser, must
effect a sale or procure a binding contract of sale from his customer before becoming enti-
tled to his commission.
130. For other cases involving listing agreements with the "sell or exchange" phrase or
similar language, see Brown v. Grimm, 258 Or. 55, 481 P.2d 63 (1971); Rogers v. Hendrix, 92
Idaho 141, 438 P.2d 653 (1968); Bradley v. Westerfield, 1 Ariz. App. 319, 402 P.2d 577
(1965); Wesley N. Taylor Co. v. Russell, 194 Cal. App. 2d 816, 15 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1961);
Note, Special Conditions in Real Estate Brokerage Contracts, 32 COL. L. REv. 1194, 1195
(1932) (" 'In the event of sale', 'if the property is sold', 'on sale', 'if a sale is effected' have all
been held to refer to the signing of the contract of sale"-citing cases).
131. A consideration is not necessary to make an agent's authority binding on the
principal, MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-10-202 (1981), and a written instrument is presumptive
evidence of consideration, MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-804 (1981). Furthermore, the recital ap-
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The "ready and willing" language was used because there is ample
authority for the proposition that when a broker undertakes to
produce a ready and willing buyer, no enforceable contract need be
entered into by the seller and buyer for the broker to gain his
commission. 13
2
The omission of the word "able" in the description of the
buyer may defeat a seller's defense that the purchaser produced
was unable to complete the sale, thus denying the agent his com-
mission."'s If a prospective buyer offers terms which are at vari-
ance with those on the listing, and the seller accepts, the broker
has a valid claim to a commission"3 4 under the language of the last
part of the clause.
Paragraph 2
I authorize you to accept a deposit on the purchase price and
to execute a contract for the sale of the property as my agent on
my behalf.
Analysis
In Hughes v. Melby'38 the court found that where a broker is
authorized to receive a down payment he has the implied authority
to enter into an agreement binding the sellers. To remove all
doubts, the second phrase of the clause specifically states this.'
pears to be unnecessary because in Payne v. Buechler, - Mont. -, 628 P.2d 646
(1981), the court held that a broker's expenditure of time and money to find a purchaser is
sufficient consideration for the promise to pay a commission.
132. Roscow v. Bara, 114 Mont. 246, 135 P.2d 364 (1943); Apple v. Henry, 66 Mont.
244, 213 P. 444 (1923); Laux v. Hogl, 45 Mont. 445, 123 P. 949 (1912).
133. But see Goetz v. Anderson, 274 N.W.2d 175 (N.D. 1978) where the court stated
that the omission of the term "able" from the description of a buyer in the listing agreement
does not relieve the broker of his duty to produce a buyer capable of purchasing on the
terms specified by the broker's employer. See also Martin v. Clinton, 239 Or. 541, 398 P.2d
752 (1965) (the seller's agreement to pay a commission for finding a "ready and willing"
buyer would be interpreted to require a "ready willing and able" buyer) and Ellsworth
Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967) (whenever there is substantial
inequality of bargaining power, a provision in the broker's listing, providing for payment of
the commission before the contract if performed, will be deemed against public policy and
unenforceable).
See generally Annot., 9 P.O.F.2d 115, 129-30 (1976).
134. Diehl & Assocs., Inc. v. Houtchens, 173 Mont. 372, 567 P.2d 930 (1977).
135. 135 Mont. 415, 340 P.2d 511 (1959). In Hughes the exact language of the listing
was that the broker was authorized to receive a "deposit on the sale price." See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 52 (1958).
136. The authority given to the agent to bind the principal on a contract for the sale
of land must be in writing. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-903(1)(d); Schwedes v. Romain, 179
Mont. 466, 587 P.2d 388 (1978). See also Stafford v. Love, 151 Mont. 270, 442 P.2d 190
(1968) (ordinarily the authority to execute a contract on behalf of the principal must be
specifically conferred upon the agent by the listing agreement) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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The purpose of this clause is to give the broker the authority to
bind the principal on a buy-sell or other sale document and to but-
tress the agent's argument that he has produced not only a ready
and willing buyer but an enforceable sale agreement as well.
Paragraph 3
I agree to pay you a commission in cash for your services in
an amount equal to _% of the selling price if either of the
following conditions is met:
1) you produce a buyer ready and willing to purchase the
property described in this agreement at the selling price and
terms noted or at such other price and terms as I accept; or
2) I am placed in contact with a buyer who has become in-
terested in the property through your efforts directly or in-
directly during the term of this agreement or within 180
days of its termination or a longer time if reasonable and
a) I agree to sell, exchange, lease, or lend the property to or
through the buyer, and
b) such agreement ultimately results in an agreement to sell
the property.
I further agree to pay the commission whether or not a writ-
ten agreement for sale is executed.
Analysis
The "directly or indirectly" language in the first part of the
second condition is taken from Shober v. Dean.13 The court held
that by inserting "indirectly" in the contract, the parties intended
the broker to recover his full commission if he set in motion a
chain of events which culminated in the sale of the property. The
"180 days" provision is the longest period (subsequent to the ter-
mination of the listing) discussed in the Montana cases,13 and a
similar ninety-day provision was upheld in Nardi v. Smalley. 39
The "reasonable time" phrase attempts to bring Stromberg v.
Seaton Rancy Co.140 into play, where the court found that in the
absence of a stated time period, 285 days was a reasonable time.
The final sentence is intended to lay to rest any arguments by the
seller that the broker's commission does not mature until a binding
OF AGENCY § 55 (1958). See generally Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1014 (1955).
137. 39 Mont. 255, 102 P. 323 (1909), cited with approval and followed in Barrett v.
Ballard, - Mont. -, 622 P.2d 180 (1980).
138. Assoc'd. Agency of Bozeman, Inc. v. Pasha, - Mont. __, 625 P.2d 38 (1981);
Flinders v. Gilbert, 141 Mont. 442, 378 P.2d 385 (1963). See Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 1149
(1973).
139. - Mont. , 643 P.2d 228 (1982).
140. 260 Mont. 293, 502 P.2d 41 (1972).
220 [Vol. 44
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agreement is signed and guards against the situation where the
broker produces a ready and willing buyer but the seller wrongfully
refuses to consummate the sale, as discussed in Pasha.
Paragraph 3A (alternative)
In the event a written agreement is executed for the sale of
said property, I hereby agree to pay you in cash a commission
equal in amount to __ % of the selling price for your services
in securing or procuring a purchaser.
Analysis
The above clause is inserted to grant the broker a commission
if a buy-sell is executed and the purchaser defaults. The clause is
the product of a nation-wide survey of those jurisdictions which
allow the broker to recover a commission in these circumstances."'
The survey indicates that the words "securing" or "procuring"
were consistently relied on by the courts in granting a commission
where the buyer defaults after signing an enforceable sale
agreement. " 2
This is the second method by which this proposed listing
agreement seeks to avoid the situation that arose in Diehl and Hol-
linger, where a prospective buyer defaults after signing a buy-sell.
The first method is the elimination of the "sell or exchange" lan-
guage as discussed in connection with Paragraph 1.
Paragraph 4
This listing is an exclusive listing and I grant you the exclu-
sive, sole right to deal with the property described in this agree-
ment. I agree to pay you the entire commission if I or any other
person sell, exchange, or lease the property or any part of it dur-
ing the term of your employment or if I withdraw the property
from the market during that time.
Analysis
This clause is similar to a clause discussed in Diehl and Hol-
linger. The "sell or exchange" language of the original clause is
deleted in favor of the phrase "deal with."
There is a distinction between an exclusive agency to sell and
141. Annot., 12 A.L.R.4th 1083, 1090-93 (1982).
142. Four cases were found where the words "procuring" or "securing" a purchaser
allowed the granting of a commission after the buyer's default. See Cass Co. v. Nannarello,
274 S.C. 26, 262 S.E.2d 924 (1980); Winston v. Minkin, 63 Wis. 2d 46, 216 N.W.2d 38 (1974);
Nelson v. Rosenblum Co., 289 Minn. 32, 182 N.W.2d 666 (1970); Ogden Savings & Trust Co.
v. Blakely, 66 Utah 229, 241 P. 221 (1925).
1983]
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an exclusive right of sale.14 3 If the owner under an exclusive agency
sells the property, no right to a commission accrues; however, if the
seller has given the agent an exclusive right of sale, even a sale by
the owner during the term of the listing results in a commission for
the broker. The clearest way to guaranty that the agreement will
be interpreted as an exclusive right of sale is to insert unequivocal
language providing for the payment of a commission upon the sale
of the property by the owner himself.14 4 This clause has been inter-
preted by the Montana Supreme Court as not allowing the owner
to sell the property without forfeiting the commission.1 45
The phrase regarding the withdrawal of authority has been
upheld in two Montana cases 46 but was held ineffective in a third
where the broker did not explain the effect of the clause to the
seller.14 7 The clause regarding the owner's right to withdraw the
property from the market penalizes the exercise of that right, an
issue which arose in a Colorado case. 48
Paragraph 5
In case of suit or action on this contract, I agree to pay col-
lection costs, court costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred by
you at trial and on appeal.
Analysis
If a broker is successful in his commission suit, there must be
a clause of this type in the contract or he will not be able to re-
cover attorney fees from the principal."' Although the clause has
143. Note, Contracts-Real Estate Brokers-Exclusive Right of Sale Provisions, 42
TENN. L. REV. 405, 406 (1975); Note, Real Estate Brokers' Contracts in South Carolina, 18
S.C. L. REV. 819, 832-33 (1966).
144. 42 TENN. L. REV. at 407. See Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 1243 (1976) and Annot., 88
A.L.R.2d 936 (1963).
145. Payne v. Buechler, - Mont. - , 628 P.2d 646 (1981). See also Lyle v. Moore,
__ Mont. -, 599 P.2d 336 (1979) (the clause was similarly interpreted, but since the
broker did not disclose this fact to the sellers, no commission was awarded) and Platt &
Heath Co. v. Wilmer, 87 Mont. 382, 288 P. 1021 (1930) (where the owner sold the property
under a listing granting the broker the sole and exclusive right to sell, the broker was enti-
tled to the commission).
146. Assoc'd. Agency of Bozeman, Inc. v. Pasha, - Mont. -, 625 P.2d 38 (1981);
Payne v. Buechler, - Mont. - , 628 P.2d 646 (1981). See Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 1243
(1976).
See also McDonald and Co. v. Fishtail Creek Ranch Ltd., 175 Mont. 53, 572 P.2d 195
(1977) (held that the seller's attempted early termination of the listing was not effective and
granted the broker its commission).
147. Lyle v. Moore, - Mont. - , 599 P.2d 336 (1979).
148. Garrett v. Richardson, 149 Colo. 449, 369 P.2d 566 (1962) (court interpreted the
irrevocable right to sell clause as prohibiting withdrawal from market).
149. Montana follows the American rule on attorney fees, which states that, absent a
statute or contractual provision providing for attorney fees, no attorney fees may be
26
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been recently upheld,"" it has also backfired several times, requir-
ing the broker to pay the principal's attorney fees'81 by virtue of
the reciprocal attorney fee statute."'
Paragraph 6
I agree not to seek indemnity against the broker whose name
appears below, or his agents, for the claims of other brokers to
commissions regarding the property.
Analysis
This clause is designed to protect the broker from the seller
seeking indemnity against him for other brokers' claims to com-
missions on the same property. It has been suggested that the in-
demnity clause should provide for the broker's indemnifying the
seller for other claims but then limit the broker's liability to the
commission actually paid him.' From the realtor's standpoint,
however, it seems preferable not to expose himself to indemnity
from the outset.
Paragraph 7
I will convey the following part of the property by quitclaim
deed only:
Analysis
This sentence, allowing space for property to be quitclaimed,
is primarily for convenience and the buyer's information. The situ-
ation may arise where the seller owns less than fee simple title, and
this sentence would prove important.
For example, in Stafford v. Love, 84 approximately eighty acres
granted. Town Pump, Inc. v. Diteman, - Mont. -, 622 P.2d 212 (1981). There is no
statute granting brokers attorney fees on successful commission suits so the recovery must
be on a contractual basis.
150. Nardi v. Smalley, - Mont. -, 643 P.2d 228 (1982).
151. Diehl & Assocs. v. Houtchens, 180 Mont. 48, 588 P.2d 1014 (1979); Lyle v. Moore,
- Mont. -, 599 P.2d 336 (1979); Flaherty v. Hensley, 165 Mont. 434, 529 P.2d 1389
(1975).
152. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-704 (1981). For another recent case interpreting this
statute, see Sliters v. Lee, - Mont. - , 641 P.2d 475 (1982) (assignor of note held not
able to rely on contractual right to attorney fees for successfully defending against maker's
third party action).
153. Barasch, Negotiating Real Estate Brokerage Agreements, 8 REAL EsTATE L.J.
240, 253 (1980).
154. 151 Mont. 270, 442 P.2d 190 (1968). The broker's duty in interpreting abstracts of
title was outlined in Butte Land & Inv. Co. v. Williams, 55 Mont. 39, 173 P. 550 (1918)
where the court interpreted a clause in which the seller agreed to furnish an abstract of title
to date of sale. The court held that it was the broker's duty simply to pass the abstract to
the purchaser and let her decide whether to purchase the property, rather than interpret the
1983]
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of the 750 acres for sale were in previously platted subdivisions, a
part of which the sellers did not own. Their ownership of the bal-
ance was based on tax deed conveyances. The parties printed on
the listing agreement the part of the property that could be con-
veyed by quitclaim deed only.
Paragraph 8
I certify that I have read and received a copy of this contract.
I further certify that it has been called to my attention, and I
understand, that if I sell the property myself during the term of
this listing or if I revoke or attempt to revoke the agent's right to
sell, I will have to pay the stated commission.
Analysis
Under Montana law the failure to provide the principal with a
copy of the listing vitiates a cause of action for the commission. 16
Although probably not conclusive, the first sentence should
strengthen a broker's defense to the seller's claim that he did not
receive a copy of the listing. The second sentence was drafted to
avoid the consequences of Lyle v. Moore,"' where the court found
that the failure of the broker to call to the attention of the seller
the provision prohibiting the owner selling the property barred any
commission based on that provision.16
VII. CONCLUSION
The discussion of the law on- brokers in Montana makes sev-
eral points clear. The listing agreement is a vital document in the
broker's trade, and statements spelling out the agent's obligations
should be carefully considered. Not only is the scope of the agent's
authority dictated by its provisions, but courts will look to the
agreement to ascertain whether the broker has discharged his as-
sumed obligations, entitling him to a commission.
Just what a broker must accomplish to be entitled to a com-
mission is unclear in Montana. The statements in Diehl that pay-
ment of the purchase price and conveyance of title are needed
before the right to a commission accrues are currently unsupported
and should be expressly overruled. The court should clearly adopt
a commercially reasonable definition of "sale." Such a definition
abstract for her.
155. Assoc'd. Agency of Bozeman, Inc. v. Pasha, - Mont. -, 625 P.2d 38 (1981);
Carnell v. Watson, 176 Mont. 344, 578 P.2d 308 (1978).
156. - Mont. -, 599 P.2d 336 (1979).
157. But see Guthrie v. Halloran, 90 Mont. 373, 3 P.2d 406 (1931) (a contract cannot
be avoided on the defense of failing to read it before signing it).
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was implied in Nardi, when the court held that the execution of a
contract for deed is a sale.' " Nardi offers a more workable solution
but leaves unanswered the question of whether the execution of a
buy-sell is a sale as well. Hollinger, decided after Diehl, arguably
implies that a buy-sell is a sale and satisfies "sell or exchange" lan-
guage identical to that in Diehl. Furthermore, the fact that both
buyers and sellers may require the other party to specifically per-
form a buy-sell " 9 makes it tantamount to a contract for deed in
that respect. On the other hand, the statutory definition of
"sale"1 60 requires that an interest in property be transferred to the
buyer, and the buyer arguably does not receive equitable title on
the execution of a buy-sell. 6'
Under the present status of the law, brokers and attorneys
who represent them must ponder exactly what constitutes a sale
because there is no uniform rule of law that can be gleaned from
the cases. The broker should seize the opportunity to moot this
issue by drafting a clear listing agreement under which the bro-
ker's commission hinges on the production of a ready and willing
buyer rather than a sale.
There is also the possibility of enacting legislation, as some
states have done,'62 to define statutorily the broker's obligation in
obtaining a commission. In the alternative, the Montana Supreme
Court could take a definitive stance as did the New Jersey court in
Ellsworth Dobbs,6 3 specifically outlining what steps the agent
must fulfill to gain his fee. If either of these latter two approaches
is adopted, then the issue becomes whether the parties can, by lan-
158. Nardi v. Smalley, - Mont. - , 643 P.2d 228 (1982). But see Franzke v. Fer-
gus Co., 76 Mont. 150, 245 P. 962 (1926) (installment land contract was not a sale but
merely an agreement to sell because no title passed immediately).
159. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
160. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 30-11-101 (1981).
161. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-11-108 (1981) states than an agreement to sell real prop-
erty binds the seller to execute a conveyance sufficient to pass title to the property, inferring
that the agreement to sell itself does not so pass the title. Cf. Wright Land & Inv. Co. v.
Even, 57 Mont. 1, 186 P. 681 (1919) (an agreement to sell and buy was not a sale because
there was no transfer of title).
If the execution of a contract for deed, and not a buy/sell, is the triggering event, then
the burden of the buyer's default is placed on the broker until closing. If the seller success-
fully sues for specific performance after default but prior to closing, has there been a sale so
as to allow the broker to collect his commission? Some courts have granted the broker his
commission under these circumstances, Annot., 12 A.L.R.4th 1083, 1137-38 (1982).
If the seller chooses not to sue for specific performance, and the broker's commission is
denied, the seller has the power to determine whether the broker will get his commission
which may run counter to the original agreement where the right to a commission turns on
the production of a ready and willing buyer.
162. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
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guage in the listing agreement, circumvent the conditions set forth.
Absent legislation, these issues deserve the attention and ac-
tion of the Montana Supreme Court as the state court of last re-
sort for brokers in their commission cases.
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